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SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY:  
 THE NFLPA AND NFL’S LOCKOUT SIDE-
AGREEMENT SUBJECTING CEDRIC BENSON TO 
A SUSPENSION FOR HIS CONDUCT DURING THE 




“I think he has way too much power.”
1
 Terrell Suggs’ statement 
summarizes a growing attitude amongst players and fans who perceive the 
commissioner of the National Football League (“NFL,” “League”) as a 
dictator.
2
 Legal scholars have also fearfully suggested that the 
commissioner’s role as the prosecutor, judge, and jury constitutes broad 
power akin to that of a totalitarian regime.
3
  
Through its ability to discipline players, the NFL has the power to fine or 
suspend players like Michael Vick for their actions off the field.
4
 The 
League has acquired this power over discipline through a provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) which allows the commissioner 
                                               

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1
 Keith Van Valkenberg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012), http://espn.go.com/ 
nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-power-gone-too-far-espn-
magazine (reporting that many players on the Baltimore Ravens and Pittsburgh Steelers 
have taken issue with some of NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s decisions to fine or 
suspend players). 
2
 See James Harrison Rips Roger Goodell, ESPN (July 14, 2011, 8:29 AM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6764826/james-harrison-pittsburgh-steelers-blasts-
roger-goodell-magazine-interview (referring to Goodell as “the devil” and “a 
dictator”); see also Tom Weir, Brian Urlacher Puts ‘Dictatorship’ Tag on Roger 
Goodell, USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2010, 3:14 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/ 
communities/gameon/post/2010/11/brian-urlacher-roger-goodell-dictator/1 (quoting 
Brian Urlacher as labeling the NFL as a “dictatorship [because] if Goodell wants to fine 
you he’s going to fine you”). 
3
 Robert Ambrose, The NFL Makes it Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of its 
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 1069, 1111 (2008). 
4
NFL Suspends Michael Vick Indefinitely, CNN (Aug. 24, 2007), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-08-24/us/michael.vick_1_phillips-and-vick-bad-newz-
kennels-animal-fighting-venture?_s=PM:US (noting that, when the NFL suspended 
Michael Vick indefinitely, Roger Goodell sent the quarterback a letter informing him 
that he was suspending him for “conduct that was not only illegal, but also cruel and 
reprehensible”). 
368 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 3:2 
to address “conduct on the playing field . . . [and] conduct detrimental to 
the integrity of, or public confidence in the game of professional football.”
5
  
However, the commissioner’s jurisdiction over discipline apparently 
extends beyond the boundaries of the NFL. The Constitution and By-Laws 
of the NFL authorize the commissioner to take appropriate steps when non-
members of the League are guilty of conduct detrimental to the League or 
even to professional football.
6
 The League’s interpretation of this section of 
its Constitution—or of the CBA’s “conduct detrimental” provision—has 
recently been under serious scrutiny as a result of decisions to discipline 
individuals who were not employed by the League at the time of their 
alleged detrimental behavior.
7
 For example, the League cited to the broad 
provision when it suspended former Ohio State University quarterback 
Terrelle Pryor in 2011 for conduct that occurred while he was in college—
conduct that occurred before he was ever employed by the NFL.
8
 Similarly, 
the League recently suspended Cedric Benson after he was convicted of an 
assault charge stemming from an incident that occurred during the NFL 
lockout, while Benson was technically unemployed.
9
 This incident poses 
more serious questions because the National Football League Players 
Association (“NFLPA”) agreed to allow the League to discipline second-
time offenders like Benson for their conduct during the lockout.
10
 However, 
while Benson filed a charge against the NLFPA for violating its duty of fair 
representation, he later withdrew his case, confirming how powerful the 
League may be.
11 
Despite whatever reasons Cedric Benson had for withdrawing the case, 
this note will argue that the NFLPA committed an unfair labor practice 
under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) when it signed a side-
                                               
5
 Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL 
Management Counsel and the NFL Players Association, art. XLVI, § ¶ a, at 204 
(2011), available at http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-
agreement-2011-2020.pdf. 
6
 See Constitution and By-Laws of the National Football League, Art. 8.6, at 29 
(1970) (Revised 2006) (“The Commissioner is authorized, at the expense of the 
League, to hire legal counsel and take or adopt appropriate legal action or such other 
steps or procedures as he deems necessary and proper in the best interests of either the 
league or professional football, whenever any party or organization not a member of, 
employed by, or connected with the league or any member thereof is guilty of any 
conduct either detrimental to the league, its member clubs or employees, or to 
professional football.”).  




 See discussion in infra Section IB.  
9
 See discussion in infra Section IC. 
10
 See id. 
11
 National Football League Players Association (Cincinnati Bengals) (09-CB-
065431, 2011). Docket activity available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CB-
065431#docket-footnote. 
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agreement subjecting Benson to punishment for actions that occurred (1) 
while the League was not operating and (2) while Benson was a free 
agent.
12
 Had Benson maintained his case before the Board, the Board 
should have found the NFLPA to be in violation of the NLRA. Part I 
provides brief background information regarding the NFL’s authority to 
discipline, the recent decisions to suspend Terrelle Pryor and Cedric 
Benson, and the NFLPA’s duty to provide fair representation.
13
 Part II 
argues that the NFLPA committed an unfair labor practice and breached its 
duty to provide fair representation to Cedric Benson because (1) 
negotiating away Benson’s rights runs counter to the objectives of the 
NLRA and an employee union’s duty to provide fair representation; (2) 
when the Union conceded jurisdiction over Benson’s lockout behavior, it 
allowed the NFL to have unprecedented power over behavior that no sports 
league has ever disciplined; and (3) it defies logic that the Union would 
allow the League to discipline Benson for conduct that occurred when he 
could not earn a paycheck from the League.
14
 Part III examines the likely 
policy implications of the League’s recent decisions to discipline players 
like Terrelle Pryor and Cedric Benson.
15
 Ultimately, this note concludes 
that the NFL’s decisions to suspend Benson and Pryor set a dangerous 
precedent, and the Union’s consent to subject Benson to the League’s 
discipline—as opposed to contesting it—is violative of the labor 
organization’s duty to provide fair representation to all of its members.
16




A. The NFL’s Authority to Discipline Players [and Non-Players] 
 
The above mentioned provisions of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws
17
 
and the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and NFLPA
18
 
provide the League with weapons for disciplining any conduct that is 
detrimental to the integrity of the League or professional football. Courts 
have affirmed the League’s broad disciplinary powers.
19
 In Holmes v. 
                                               
12
 This note will focus on the legality of the Union’s decision to submit Benson to 
league jurisdiction for his lockout behavior. Any possible legal claims against the NFL 
will not be discussed because, as noted in infra Section IC, an arbitrator has already 
ruled in favor of the NFL in a grievance filed by Benson. The running back’s NLRB 
claim against the Union has not been decided and presents a more unique legal issue. 
13 See discussion in infra Section I. 
14 See discussion in infra Section II. 
15 See discussion in infra Section III. 
16 See discussion in infra Section IV. 
17 See supra note 6. 
18 See supra note 5. 
19
 See Nat’l Football Players Assoc. v. N.L.R.B, 503 F.2d 12, 15-16 (8th Cir. 1974) 
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National Football League,
20
 a federal district court denied an NFL player’s 
constitutional challenge alleging he was not afforded his full due process 
rights when the commissioner, who was appointed by the CBA as the 
arbitrator for drug appeals, upheld his suspension.
21
 The court noted that 
the Commissioner’s power stemmed from the rules of a drug program that 
the Union and the NFL had agreed to as part of the CBA.
22
 Therefore, 
because the commissioner’s decision was consistent with the CBA, the 
plaintiff was entitled to minimal due process protection.
23
 In response to 
Holmes, an expert in the field of sports law suggested that “[i]t is evident . . 
. that judges are not much inclined to overturn decisions made by 
Commissioners about . . . player behavior that the Commissioner believes 
is a threat to the integrity of the game.”
24
 The extensive provisions in the 
CBA and the NFL Constitution, and the judicial deference to the 
commissioner’s decisions related to the integrity of the game, make Roger 
Goodell a very powerful man.
25 
B. Terrelle Pryor 
 
The NFL Commissioner’s controversial authority reached unprecedented 
levels in 2011 when he suspended Terrelle Pryor, the Oakland Raiders’ 
                                                                                                            
(recognizing that the league has the power to fine players and that disciplinary actions 
are reviewable pursuant to the NFL Constitution and By-laws); see also Suzanne 
Janusz, Comment, The NFL’s Strict Enforcement of its Personal Conduct Policy for 
Crimes Against Women: A Useful Tool for Combating Violence or an Attempt to 
Punish Morality, 2 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 93, 125 (2012) (interpreting the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Nat’l Football Players Assoc. v. N.L.R.B. and recognizing 
that while “owners cannot unilaterally take actions concerning wages, hours, or 
working conditions without negotiating with the NFLPA . . . the commissioner can 
impose disciplinary rules unilaterally by virtue of his authority to create policy with 
respect to the provisions of the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws and their 
enforcement”). C.f. Oakland Raiders v. Nat’l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 
285 n. 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (characterizing Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 
F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978)   by noting that “the Seventh Circuit noted that the baseball 
commissioner had extremely broad authority over the affairs of the professional 
baseball league”) (emphasis added). 
20
 939 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1996). 
21
 See id.  
22
 Id. at 525. 
23
 See id. (concluding that “Holmes has not alleged that the Commissioner’s ruling 
was procured by the parties’ fraud, or by dishonesty, bad faith,” and that the 
suspension “drew its essence from the Drug Program and did not constitute the 
Commissioner's own brand of industrial justice”). 
24
 PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
PROBLEMS 61 (3d ed. 2004).  
25
 See Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The 
Evolution and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 10 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 
23, 54 (2008) (noting that, while there have been “several cases in the NBA and MLB 
challenging commissioner ‘best interest’ rulings, such challenges are absent from 
football”). 
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third-round draft pick in the 2011 NFL Supplemental Draft.
26
 The NCAA 
suspended the former Ohio State University (“OSU”) quarterback for five 
games when he was found to have violated the association’s rules when he 
sold memorabilia while still at OSU.
27
 Since Pryor would not be able to 
comply with his five-game suspension at OSU once he was selected in the 
NFL Supplementary Draft, the commissioner insisted that Pryor’s 
behavior—which occurred before the quarterback was ever employed by an 
NFL team—undermined the integrity of the NFL draft, and decided to 
suspend Pryor for five games.
28
 Many have criticized the Commissioner’s 
decision, claiming that it sets a precedent that retroactively allows the 





C. Cedric Benson 
 
Cincinnati Bengals running back Cedric Benson’s suspension is perhaps 
even more eye-opening, as the NFLPA actually agreed to subject him to 
discipline for an event that occurred (1) off the field, (2) while the League 
was not operating, and (3) while Benson was a free agent.
30
 On July 17, 
2011, Benson was arrested after he allegedly punched his former roommate 
in the face.
31
 The incident occurred four months into the NFL lockout and 
                                               




 Id.  
28
 See Mike Florio, In Suspending Pryor, League Relied on General Provisions 
Regarding ‘Detrimental Conduct’, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2011, 11:02 AM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/18/in-suspending-pryor-league-relied-on-
general-provisions-regarding-detrimental-conduct/ (reporting that, in suspending Pryor, 
Goodell relied on Article 8.6 of the NFL Constitution and By-laws, which authorizes 
the commissioner to take appropriate steps when non-members of the league are guilty 
of conduct detrimental to the league or to professional football).  
29
 See, e.g., Roger Goodell Gone Too Far, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:39 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/22/tiebreak-goodell-nfl-pryor-
suspension_n_933105.html (suggesting that Pryor’s suspension is “all about the 
commish”); Tim Keown, Roger Goodell Merges NFL, NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 18, 2011, 
5:00 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/id/6874169/terrelle-pryor-
suspension-nfl-ncaa-merger (indicating that Goodell’s decision merges all NCAA rules 
with NFL rules). 




 See Gregg Rosenthal, More Details Come out About Benson’s Arrest, NBC 
SPORTS (July 18, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/18/ 
more-details-come-out-about-cedric-benson/; Mike Florio, Cedric Benson Arrested for 
Assault, Again, NBC SPORTS (July 17, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://profootballtalk. 
nbcsports.com/2011/07/17/cedric-benson-arrested-again (explaining accusations made 
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after the Union had decertified.
32
 About two weeks after Benson’s arrest, 
the Union recertified and was again able to operate as the players’ 
exclusive bargaining agent with the League.
33
 Shortly thereafter, the 
League and the Union agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement.
34
  
The Union and the League also signed an additional side-agreement, 
exempting first time offenders from League discipline for off-the-field 
behavior that occurred during the lockout.
35
 In exchange, however, the 
agreement subjected eight players who were repeat offenders—including 
Benson—to League discipline for their behavior during the lockout.
36
 
About a month later, Benson was found guilty of assault, and sentenced to 
twenty days in prison.
37
 The running back was subsequently released for 
good behavior after serving a five-day sentence.
38
  
While Benson did not have to miss any playing time due to his sentence 
because he completed his term of incarceration prior to the start of the 
NFL’s regular season, the mutually agreed-upon side agreement did keep 
Benson off the field for a small part of the season. Three weeks into the 
season, the League suspended Benson for three games for his conduct 
during the lockout.
39
 Benson appealed the decision and the League reduced 
                                                                                                            
against Pryor). 
32
 See John Clayton, NFL to Vote Thursday, ESPN (July 21, 2011, 5:48 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6789837/nfl-lockout-owners-vote-Thursday (noting 
that the NFL lockout began on March 11, 2011); Report: NFL locks out players, who 
file suit, ESPN (Mar. 12, 2011, 4:26PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ 
story?id=6205936 (explaining that the NFLPA decertified, thereby declaring itself out 
of the business of representing NFL players). 
33
 See Report: NFLPA Recertified as Union, ESPN (July 30, 2011, 10:55 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6818756/report-nfl-players-union-recertified-final-
negotiations-nfl (noting that the NFLP A was recertified as the NFL players’ exclusive 
bargaining representative).  
34
 See, e.g. Goodell, Smith Sign 10-Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, CBS 
SPORTS (Aug. 5, 2011), http://cbssports.com/nfl/story/15401364/goodell-smith-sign-
10year-collective-bargaining-agreement. (noting that the NFL and NFLPA had reached 
a new collective bargaining agreement).  
35
 Mike Florio, NFL Attempts to Explain August 4 Letter Agreement, NBC Sports 
(Oct. 29, 2011, 10:07 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/29/nflpa-
attempts-to-explain-august-4-letter-agreement. 
36
 Mike Florio, Fight Looming between NFL, NFLPA over Lockout Arrests, NBC 
SPORTS (Sept. 24, 2011, 10:07 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/ 
24/fight-looming-between-nfl-nflpa-over-lockout-arrests/; see also Source: Cedric 
Benson Files vs. NFLPA, ESPN (Sept. 25, 2011, 11:21 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/ 
story/_/id/7018584/cedric-benson-cincinnati-bengals-files-nlrb-charge-vs-nflpa-source-
says (listing Adam “Pacman” Jones, Johnny Jolly, Aqib Talib, Clark Haggan, Albert 
Haynesworth, Kenny Britt, and Brandon Underwood as the other seven players). 
37
 Joe Reedy, Bengals’ Cedric Benson Released from Texas Jail, USA TODAY (Sept. 
4, 2011, 1:47 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/bengals/story/2011-
09-03/Bengals-Cedric-Benson-released-from-Texas-jail/50252194/1. 
38
 See id. 
39
 Mike Florio, Cedric Benson Gets Three Game Suspension, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 22, 
2011, 4:26 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/22/cedric-benson-gets-
three-game-suspension/. 
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the punishment to a one-game suspension.
40
 Benson also unsuccessfully 
filed a grievance against the League, arguing that the NFL did not have 
jurisdiction over Benson’s actions during the lockout.
41
 Finally, Benson 
filed an unfair labor practice grievance with the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”) alleging that the Union unfairly agreed to subject him to 
punishment, though the General Counsel of the NLRB accepted Benson’s 
withdrawal on November 22, 2011.
42
  
D. The NFLPA’s Duty of Fair Representation 
 
The NLRA provides employees of an organization, including a 
professional sports league, with the right to organize themselves into a 
union, to engage in collective bargaining with their employer, and, at times, 
to strike.
43
 Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employers from interfering 
with these rights, deeming such interference an unfair labor practice.
44
 
While not explicitly mentioned in the NLRA, one of the protections that the 
NLRB and the Supreme Court have recognized as inherent to these worker 
protections is the union’s duty of fair representation.
45
 The union owes this 
duty to all employees—even non-union members—during the negotiation 
and execution of the collective bargaining agreement.
46
 
A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its conduct toward an 
employee is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”
47
 A union’s actions 
are arbitrary only if, “in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time 
of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of 
reasonableness as to be irrational.”
48
 Moreover, union discriminatory 
conduct violates the duty of fair representation if it is invidious.
49
 Finally, a 
violation on the basis of bad faith “requires a showing of fraud, deceitful 
                                               
40
 See NFL Attempts to Explain August 4 Letter Agreement supra note 35. 
41
 See id.  
42
 See id. National Football League Players Association (Cincinnati Bengals) (09-
CB-065431, 2011). Docket activity available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CB-
065431#docket-footnote. 
43
 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 277 (citing National Labor Relations 




 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (outlining union activity that 
constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation); Hughes Tool, 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 
329 (1953) (holding that a union could not charge non-union employees a flat-rate fee 
for handling their grievances).  
46
 See Hughes Tool, 104 N.L.R.B. at 327 (stating that “all employees in an 
appropriate unit are entitled, upon their request, to the impartial assistance of the 
certified representative in the filing and adjustment of grievances.”).  
47
 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.  
48
 Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991).  
49
 See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182 (noting that “[it] would raise grave constitutional 
problems if unions were free to exercise this power to further racial discrimination.”).  
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action, or dishonest action.”
50
 Accordingly, this note focuses on arbitrary 
behavior because there is no evidence that the Union engaged in invidious 
discriminatory conduct or fraud, deceit, or dishonesty. 
A union’s behavior is arbitrary if it reflects a reckless disregard for the 
rights of the individual employee, “but not if it represents only simple 
negligence.”
51
 The union’s representation does not need to be error-free, as 
courts have feared that holding labor organizations to a high standard of 
care would hurt their ability to vigorously represent employees.
52
 In 
Peterson v. Kennedy, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the NFLPA did not breach its duty of fair representation when it 
provided a player with incorrect advice on whether to file an injury or non-
injury grievance, resulting in the Statute of Limitations running out before 
the player could file his grievance.
53
 In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the 
Court noted that the NFLPA’s error was in mishandling a complex issue 
and that the court would not hold the Union to a standard of perfection.
54
 In 
light of this precedent, Cedric Benson’s claim against the NFLPA was 
required to meet a high standard: the Union’s conduct must have been 
egregious enough to overcome this significant hurdle.
55 
 
II. THE UNION COMMITTED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE WHEN IT 
AGREED TO SUBJECT BENSON TO A SUSPENSION FOR HIS CONDUCT 
DURING THE LOCKOUT 
 
The NFLPA breached its duty to fairly represent Cedric Benson when it 
engaged in an agreement with the NFL allowing the League to discipline 
Benson for his conduct during the lockout. The Union breached its duty in 
three ways. First, when the Union conceded jurisdiction to the NFL over 
Benson’s behavior during the lockout, it gave the League unprecedented 
power over player discipline. The NFL’s jurisdiction over Benson’s 
lockout behavior is contrary to other leagues’ approaches to lockout 
discipline. Second, the way the NFLPA negotiated away Benson’s rights 
runs counter to the objectives of the NLRA and its duty to provide fair 
representation. Third, it defies logic that Benson could have reasonably 
anticipated the League to have the ability to discipline him for conduct that 
occurred when he could not earn a paycheck from that same employer. 
                                               
50
 Mock v. TG & Y Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 531 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Motor 
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971)). 
51
See Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Robesky v. 
Qantas Empire Airwaus Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
52
 See id. at 1259 (noting that the Court was reluctant subject union representatives to 
a higher standard due to policy considerations).  
53
 Id. at 1244. 
54
 Id. 
55 See discussion in infra Section IC. 
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These arguments will be discussed in turn.  
First, a look at how sports leagues have handled player conduct during 
lockouts provides a valuable perspective on whether a reasonable employee 
would ever expect to be disciplined for off-the-field conduct that occurred 
while the League locked him out. For example, two summers ago, Michael 
Beasley, an NBA starter who was employed by the Minnesota 
Timberwolves at the time, was arrested for possession of marijuana during 
the NBA lockout.
56
 Like Benson, Beasley was a repeat offender.
57
 
However, two weeks before Benson was arrested for assault, Tim Frank, 
the NBA’s Senior Vice-President of Basketball Communications, openly 
said that the League’s anti-drug agreement was not in effect during the 
lockout.
58
 Sports writers have commented that the decision to discipline 
Benson is the first instance of a league punishing a player for behavior that 
occurred during the lockout.
59
 
The notion that the NFLPA signed an agreement that gave the NFL 
extensive jurisdiction over Benson’s lockout behavior is therefore 
unprecedented. Even if the League’s decision to suspend Benson could 
have survived a legal challenge because of the League’s broad bylaws and 
judicial deference to the commissioner’s interpretation of the League’s 
“best-interest” provisions,
60
 the Union’s side-agreement subjecting Benson 
to discipline amounts to inefficient representation. Facilitating the League’s 
expansion of its totalitarian desires constitutes the exact behavior that the 
NLRA was designed to prevent unions from engaging in with rival 
employers.
61
 The Union’s actions amount to more than the mere negligence 
referred to in Peterson v. Kennedy.
62
 Labor unions have a duty to act in 
good faith to represent the interests of their members to the best of their 
abilities.
63
 Permitting the League to exercise jurisdiction over lockout 
behavior—jurisdiction that no league has ever exercised or even claimed 
that it had—and thus expanding the commissioner’s power to 
                                               
56
 Despite Bust, Michael Beasley Avoids NBA Substance-Abuse Policy, AOL 
SPORTING NEWS (Jul. 7, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nba/story/2011-
07-07/despite-bust-michael-beasley-avoids-nba-substance-abuse-policy.  
57
 Id.  
58
 Id.  
59
 See Ryan Wilson, Cedric Benson Gets 3 Game Suspension, CBS Sports (Sept. 22, 
2011, 6:24 PM), http://eye-on-football.blogs.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/22475988/ 
32182757/?tag=contentMain;contentBody. (noting that Benson’s suspension is the first 
instance of the NFL punishing a player for activity that occurred during a lockout). 
60
 Benson filed a grievance against the league and an arbitrator upheld the league’s 
decision to suspend him. See Andrew Brandt, Benson Grievance Against NFL 
Rejected, National Football Post (Oct. 29, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www. 
nationalfootballpost.com/Benson-grievance-against-NFL-rejected.html. 
61
 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 277. 
62
 See 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that simple negligence will not be 
enough for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim against a union representative). 
63
 See 29 U.S.C. § 151-169. 
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Second, Benson’s case involved exactly what the duty of fair 
representation was designed to protect: the concern that individual players 
would not be deprived of all avenues of protecting their interests.
65
 Here, 
the Union not only failed to fairly represent Benson’s interests, but actually 
bartered away his right to be free from the League’s decision to discipline 
him for his conduct during the lockout, effectively abandoning him.
66
 The 
Union owes the duty of fair representation to the Cedric Bensons, Kenny 
Britts, and Michael Vicks of the League as much as it owes it to a Tom 
Brady or a Peyton Manning.
67
 Under federal labor law, a union cannot 
disregard the interests of a player simply because the union does not like 
the employee, or, alternatively, because the employee does not like or is not 
a member of the union.
68
 Allowing the Union to decide that it will negotiate 
away Benson’s right to play so that other players are not disciplined for 
their conduct during the lockout is troublesome for the same reason: it 
allows the Union to arbitrarily support some players more than others.
69
 By 
choosing not to punish first-time offenders while simultaneously subjecting 
repeat offenders, like Benson, to the League’s punishment, the Union 
discriminated against a select population within the bargaining unit.
70
 The 
duty of fair representation does not permit selective lawyering,
71
 and 
                                               
64
 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).  
65
 See Delcostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 n.14 
(1983) (holding that “[i]n such a system, if individual employees are not to be deprived 
of all effective means of protecting their own interests, it must be the duty of the 
representative organization ‘to serve the interests of all members without hostility or 
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and 
honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177). 
66




 See, e.g., Michael Silver, Goodell Overreaches with Personal Conduct Policy, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 25, 10:27 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-
silver_player_conduct_britt_cba_union_082511 (“[DeMaurice] Smith . . . has to 
understand that advocating for the interests of guys like Britt, Talib, Brandon Marshall, 
Cedric Benson and, yes, Michael Vick and Ben Roethlisberger is part of the gig.”).  
68
 See Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding 
that an airline workers’ union breached its duty of fair representation when it 
discriminated against passenger-relations agents because they were not members of the 
union); see also Silver, supra note 67 (acknowledging that when former NBA player 
Latrell Sprewell choked his coach and was suspended for a full season, the NBA 
Players’ Association persuaded an arbitrator to reduce the suspension to 68 games 
because “Sprewell was a dues-paying member of the union, and it was the players’ 
association’s job to fight for his interests”) (emphasis added).  
69
 See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 (1967) (highlighting that a union cannot arbitrarily 
select which employees it will represent). 
70
 See Florio, supra note 36 (describing the seemingly disparate treatment the first 
time offenders received with the penalty imposed upon Benson). 
71
 See id. (recognizing that a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its 
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precedent holds that this deliberate abandonment of Benson’s rights 
constituted an unfair labor practice.
72
  
Third, a player who was a free agent during an employer-instituted 
lockout could not have reasonably expected to later be disciplined for his 
behavior during that period. At the very least, the Union could have held 
the position that the League lost its ability to punish the players when it 
decided to lock them out.
73
 Alternatively, when the Union was discussing 
the side-agreement with the NFL, it had a duty to inform Benson that he 
could be subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of the League for his behavior 
during the lockout.
74
 The Union did not inform Benson of this problem, 
instead signing a side-agreement that would ultimately subject him to a 
one-game suspension.
75
 The fact that the League could discipline Benson 
during a time when the player did not have a right to a paycheck or medical 
benefits defies logic. Tim Frank’s announcement that the NBA had no 
jurisdiction over Michael Beasley’s lockout behavior is a reasonable 
indication that neither Cedric Benson nor any athlete would have thought 
that Goodell had the authority to punish the running back for his behavior 
during the lockout.
76
 The NFLPA’s concession in this matter sets a 
dangerous precedent. 
 
III. THE LEAGUE’S DECISIONS TO SUSPEND PRYOR AND BENSON SET A 
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT REGARDING THE COMMISSIONER’S POWER 
 
Gabe Feldman, an associate professor and director of the sports law 
program at Tulane University Law School,
77
 commented on the potential 
implications of a league telling its players “you cannot be paid while we 
lock you out but you can be punished.”
78
 Unfortunately for the players, 
                                                                                                            
conduct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith). 
72
 See Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 993 F.2d 
1463, 1471 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that bartering away plaintiffs’ interests constituted 
a breach of the duty of fair representation when the union signed a side-agreement 
releasing employees from their right to sue the employer after it reopened a plant with 
non-union employees).  
73
 See Silver, supra note 67. 
74
 Cf. Machinist Dist. No. 4 (McDonnell Douglas), 283 N.L.R.B. 881 (1987) (“the 
necessity to give members notice of the existence of any rules or impediments to 
resignation prior to penalizing them for failing to adhere or comply with such is 
required by a labor organization’s fiduciary duty of fair representation . . . .”). 
75
 See Florio, supra note 36. 
76
 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
77
 Gabriel Feldman Profile, TULANE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law. 
tulane.edu/tlsfaculty/profiles.aspx?id=412. 
78
 See Jon Saraceno, Benson Battles Suspension, Union, USA TODAY, Sept.  28, 
2011, at 1C (recognizing that the issue of whether the NFL could discipline Benson for 
conduct that occurred during the lockout was “intriguing because there is not much 
precedent to guide either side”). 
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Roger Goodell’s power is so broad that he now apparently has the 
jurisdiction to discipline players for conduct that occurs while a player is 
wholly unaffiliated with professional football—whether that person was a 
college football player like Pryor or an out-of-work trouble-maker like 
Benson.
79
 Either way, the League’s broad jurisdiction is troubling. 
Punishing players for conduct that does not occur during times of official 
employment creates major concerns regarding the NFL’s reach and its 
ability to arbitrarily enforce policies. These concerns were illustrated when 
Terrelle Pryor was suspended for five games, while Seattle Seahawks head 
coach Pete Carroll was able to seek refuge in coaching a professional 




Another example of the policy’s unequal application was when Detroit 
Lions head coach Jim Schwartz and former Oakland Raiders head coach 
Tom Cable avoided any League discipline for physically confronting other 
coaches.
81
 These on and off-the-field acts run afoul of the requirements of 
the NFL Constitution and By-laws.
82
 However, according to Goodell, 
neither of these coaches’ behavior is as troubling as Chicago Bears wide-
receiver Earl Bennett’s decision to wear orange cleats during a game.
83
 
Bennett received a $5,000 fine;
84
 Schwartz and Cable received warning 
letters.
85
    
Additionally, accepting the Pryor suspension as precedent, it seems 
Goodell could now suspend Kellen Winslow Jr. and fellow University of 
Miami players for their alleged ties with an infamous convicted booster 
while they played college football.
86
 After all, in suspending Terrelle 




David Hough, Goodell Out of Bounds on this Ruling: Penalizing Pryor for his Sins 
at OSU is a Slippery Slope, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2011, at C1. 
81
 See NFL Won’t Discipline Harbaugh, Schwartz for Post-game Tussle, NFL.com 
(Oct. 17, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news.story/09000d5d82337b2e/ 
article/nfl-wont-discipline-harbaugh-schwartz-for-postgame-tussle (Schwartz charged 
at another coach following the conclusion of a game); Adam Schefter, NFL Unlikely to 
Discipline Cable, ESPN (Nov. 16, 2009, 5:01 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
nfl/news/story?id=4657147 (Cable allegedly punched one of his assistant coaches). 
82
 See Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the 
NFL Management Counsel and the NFL Players Association supra note 5; Constitution 
and By-Laws of the National Football League supra note 6. 
83
 See Bears WR Bennett Fined $5K for Bright Orange Shoes, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 9, 2011, 7:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20111109/fbn-
bears-bennet-fined (Bennett received a $5,000 fine for wearing bright orange shoes 




 See NFL Won’t Discipline Harbaugh, Schwartz for Post-game Tussle, supra note 
81. 
86
 See Hough, supra note 80 (providing an interesting overview regarding many of 
the troubling implications of Goodell’s decision to suspend Pryor, including tainting 
Reggie Bush’s Super Bowl ring like the NCAA did to his Heisman Trophy). 
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Pryor—a player who was disciplined for conduct that occurred while he 
had never worked for the League—some say Goodell essentially merged 
the NCAA and NFL codes of conduct.
87
 The minimal due process rights 
owed by League commissioners to players, and the judicial deference owed 
to Goodell’s decisions make these precedents quite frightening.
88
  
The new collective bargaining agreement has not reined in Goodell’s 
authority.
89
 The Terrelle Pryor and Cedric Benson precedents suggest that, 
if the trend continues, players will need the assistance of  their union leaders 
to challenge the Commissioner’s authority. However, when the Union itself 
concedes unprecedented authority to an already powerful commissioner, 
the players are left with little recourse to protect their rights. If Cedric 
Benson had maintained his case, the NLRB would have had an opportunity 
to urge the NFLPA to be more reactive to the Commissioner’s trending 
increase in authority. Perhaps this issue must await an athlete who is more 
willing to sustain their claim against the NFLPA, despite all the pressures 




If he did not withdraw his case, Cedric Benson should have prevailed in 
his NLRB challenge to the NFLPA’s side-agreement with the League. 
When the Union decided to agree to subject Benson to the League’s 
discipline—as opposed to contesting the League’s controversial, 
authoritarian proposal—the labor organization violated its duty of fair 
representation. Moreover, the NFL’s recent decisions to suspend Cedric 
Benson and Terrelle Pryor raise concerns regarding the League’s ability to 
discipline players for conduct that occurred while they were not employed 
by the NFL. Labor unions were designed to level the playing field between 
employees and employers. Unfortunately, when unions like the NFLPA 
concede outrageous demands to employers and, in doing so, trade away 
important individual player rights, employer dominance reaches 
unprecedented levels. In order to uphold its obligation to fairly represent its 
players, the NFLPA must be more reactive when the NFL decides to punish 
players like Pryor and Benson for conduct that occurred while they could 
not collect a paycheck from the League. 
                                               
87
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terrelle-pryor-leading-off.html (commenting that by punishing Pryor for actions 
committed while he was still a college student, Goodell is attempting to combine the 
two leagues). 
88
 See supra Section IA (discussing judicial deference to Goodell’s decisions and the 
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